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ABSTRACT
Chandrasekar, Swathi. M.S.E.E, Department of Electrical EngineeringWright State University,
2017. An Engage or Retreat Differential Game with Mobile Agents.
The thesis is aimed at developing optimal defensive strategies that dissuade an attacker
from engaging a defender while simultaneously persuading the attacker to retreat. A two-
player Engage or Retreat differential game is developed in which one player represents
a mobile attacker and the other player represents a mobile defender. Both players are
modeled as massless particles moving with constant velocity. The choice to terminate the
game in engagement or retreat lies with the attacker. The defender indirectly influences
the choice of the attacker by manipulating the latter’s utility function. In other words, the
defender co-operates with the attacker so that retreat appears to be the best option avail-
able. The solution to the differential game is obtained by solving two related optimization
problems namely the Game Of Engagement and Optimal Constrained Retreat. In the Game
of Engagement, the attacker terminates the game by capturing the defender.In the Optimal
Constrained Retreat, a value function constraint is imposed which deters the attacker’s re-
treat trajectory from entering into a region where it may lead to engagement. Such regions
where constrained retreat occurs are known as escort regions. The solutions to these two
problems are used to construct the global equilibrium solutions to the Engage or Retreat
differential game.The global equilibrium solution divides the admissible state space into
two regions that contain qualitatively different equilibrium control strategies. Numerical
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Introduction
During combat situations, many a time, a situation arises where the protection of high
value assets poses a challenge. If the assets are mobile, the complexity is further increased.
The assets must produce a credible threat for the attacking agents such that the attack never
occurs. This means that the defending assets must offset any reward or benefit the attacking
agents would gain. If such a scenario could be created, retreating would be a more suitable
agents for the attacking agents.
The attacker must engage when the reward for attacking is greater than the cost of
attacking the defender. In order to protect itself, the defender could increase the cost of
the attacker so that it supersedes the reward the attacker would achieve if it were to attack.
This strategy of indirectly manipulating the cost of the attacker provides the defender an
indirect form of influence which forces the attacker to retreat.
It is frivolous, however to always maximize the attacker’s cost because it may cause
the attacker to engage the defender doing the exact opposite of what is intended. Minimiz-
ing the attacker’s cost seems the only way to proceed, but that too can lead the attacker
into a region where engagement of the defender is attractive. It is of critical importance
that the defender not only minimizes the attacker’s cost but also ensures that it follows a re-
treat trajectory carefully avoiding regions where engagement is posed as the most attractive
option.
The conflict of interest in both of the agents can be analyzed in the domain of Game
Theory. Differential Game theory was first introduced by Rufus Issacs [5] and has since
1
been applied to scenarios such as the one described above. A two team differential game
was analysed in [4]. In this paper, the attacker gets close to the high-value target before the
mobile defender could intercept it.
The idea for this thesis was obtained from [3]. The paper presents a solution for
an Engage or Retreat Game where the defender was immobile. The thesis proposes a
two-player game -the attacker and the defender, both of which are mobile. The mobile
attacker must choose between two possibilities-to attack the mobile defender or to retreat
to a predefined boundary. The mobile defender on the other hand is to protect itself or
any targets by persuading the attacker to retreat. To achieve this, the defender must either
maximize the attacker’s functional or minimize the attacker’s utility.
The general technique solution used to solve the game has been taken from [2]. The
equilibrium strategies for each agent is expressed as a solution of one of two related opti-
mization problems. The initial position of the mobile agent acts determines which optimal
solution should be implemented. The first optimization problem known as GoE in which
the attacker captures the defender while the defender minimizes the utility function of the
Attacker. The second Optimization problem is known as the OCR. In this, the attacker
retreats to a pre-defined boundary called the retreat surface with the cooperation of the
defender. The defender does this by maximizing the utility function of the attacker. To en-
sure that the equilibrium trajectories do not enter the region of engagement, an inequality
constraint is imposed on the retreat trajectory with the help of the value function from the
Game of Engagement. Regions of constrained retreat called escort regions are produced
where the attacker is escorted away by the defender from engagement regions. It is cru-
cial to note that the GoE and OCR are related problems whose solutions are proven to be
equilibrium solutions to the ERG as a function of the initial state of the mobile agents.
The thesis begins with explaining the Engage or Retreat Game in Section 2. The
solutions to the game are developed in Section 3. The Game of Engagement and Optimal
Constrained Retreat are solved in Section 3.1 and 3.2 respectively. The overall solution
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is presented in Section 3.3. Numerical examples that support the solutions developed in
Section 3 are presented in section 4. Section 5 provides a brief conclusion of the thesis.
3
Game Description
The Engage or Retreat game consists of two mobile agents, the attacker and the defender,
both of whom by manipulating the state of the system strive to maximize their respective
utility functionals. The choice to engage the defender or retreat lies with the attacker. The
defender in order to escape capture, tries to maximize or minimize the attacker’s utility.
2.1 System Description
For ease of solving the game, two different but interchangeable coordinate systems are used
to describe the state of the system. The first coordinate system,which we will refer to as the
global coordinate system, is utilized to plot the agent trajectories and in certain instances to
help justify the obtained results. In this system, the position of the attacker and the defender
is defined by a pair of cartesian coordinates. The position of the attacker A is described
by the Cartesian Coordinates xA = (xA, yA). Similarly, the position of the defender D is
described by the Cartesian Coordinates xD = (xD, yD). The state of the system can be
completely represented by the vector xG = (xA, yA, xD, yD).
Both the attacker and defender move with constant speed which are defined as vA
for the attacker and vD for the defender. The attacker controls its heading through its
control variable ψ, and the defender controls its heading through its control variable θ. In
the global coordinate system, both headings are measured counterclockwise from the x-
4
Figure 2.1: Global Co-ordinate system
axis. The defender possesses an additional control variable, φ, which appears within the
attacker’s utility function. The attacker’s control, uA, and the defender’s control, uD, are
defined as
uA := ψ (2.1)
uD := (θ, φ) (2.2)
The global coordinate system is visually depicted in Figure 2.1.
Using the global coordinate system, the behavior of the system is completely described














= f(xG, uA,uD) (2.3)
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The second coordinate system, called as the relative coordinate system, is utilized in order
to simplify the development of optimality conditions. In this, the location of the defender is
represented with respect to the attacker. This system will reduce the number of dimensions
and thereby make it easier to calculate the equilibrium solutions. Once computed, the
results shall be converted to the global coordinate system and plotted.
The state of the system is completely represented by xR = (d, β, xA, yA). The first
state component d is the distance between the attacker and defender. The second state
component β is the angle made by the defender with respect to the attacker measured in
the counter-clockwise direction from the positive direction of the x axis. The third and
fourth state components, xA and yA, represent the position of the attacker. Figure 2.2
shows a graphical representation of the relative system dynamics. The global and relative
coordinates are related using the following equations.
d =
√







The control variables of the relative and global coordinates are related accordingly:
ψ = ψ̂ + β (2.6)
θ = θ̂ + β (2.7)










= sin(β). When equation
6
Figure 2.2: Relative Co-ordinate System







(xD − xA)2 + (yD − yA)2
=
2(xD − xA)(ẋD − ẋA) + 2(yD − yA)(ẏD − ẏA)
2
√
(xD − xA)2 + (yD − yA)2
=
2(xD − xA)(ẋD − ẋA) + 2(yD − yA)(ẏD − ẏA)
d
= (−vAcosψ + vDcosθ)cosβ + (−vAsinψ + vDsinθ)sinβ
= −vAcosψ̂ + vDcosθ̂ (2.8)























(xD − xA)2 + (yD − yA)2
(
(xD − xA)(ẏD − ẏA)
(xD − xA)2












Therefore, the reduced space kinematic equations are:
ẋA = vAcos(ψ̂ + β) (2.10)
ẏA = vAsin(ψ̂ + β) (2.11)





To achieve the defender’s coordinates from the relative coordinate solution the following
conversion is used. From Figure(2.2) it can be seen that
xA = xA (2.14)
yA = yA (2.15)
xD = dcosβ + xA (2.16)
yD = dsinβ + yA (2.17)
.
The termination conditions play a vital role in determining when the Engage or Re-
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treat game ends or terminates. The vector xf denotes the state at the terminal time tf . The
terminal time is defined as the point at which the state of the system satisfies either the en-
gagement condition ΓE(x) = 0 or the retreat condition ΓR(x) = 0. The capture condition
is satisfied when the attacker comes within the capture distance, dc > 0, and the defender:
ΓE(xf ) = d− dc = 0. (2.18)
The retreat condition is met when the attacker retreats a defined retreat boundary:
ΓR(xf ) = yA − yR = 0. (2.19)
The sets of state values that satisfy the terminal conditions engagement surface, XE , and
retreat surface, XR, can now be defined with the help of their respective terminal condi-
tions:
XE : = {x ∈ R4|ΓE(x) = 0}
XR : = {x ∈ R4|ΓR(x) = 0}.
2.2 Agent Utilities
Both agents strive to maximize their utility functions by manipulating the state of the sys-
tem. Although the utility functions depend on the initial state x0, it is not an independent
variable and cannot be controlled by either agent. Hence, it will be included as a parameter
and not as an independent variable in the utility functions. The attacker’s utility function
consists of a terminal value function and an integral cost function. The defender’s utility
function consists of the terminal value function alone. The utility function of the attacker
9
and the utility function of the defender are defined as:




UD(uA(t),uD(t); x0) := φD(xf ) (2.21)
In equation (2.20), the function CA(uA(τ),uD(τ),x(τ)) is the instantaneous cost that shall
be integrated over the duration of the game and φA(xf ) is the terminal value function for
the attacker. The instantaneous cost function is defined as
CA(uA(t),uD(t),x(t)) = −(φ+ c2) where 0 ≤ φ ≤ c1 (2.22)
The constant c2 represents a time or energy penalty for the mobile attacker. The function
φD(xf ) is the terminal value function for the defender.
Each agent has a preference as to whether the game must terminate in engagement or
retreat. Suppose, the attacker prefers that the game terminates in engagement over retreat
if the integral cost is ignored.
φA(xE) > φA(xR) ∀ xE ∈ XE,xR ∈ XR (2.23)
If the choice were to be made by the defender, preference would be given to terminating
the game in retreat over engagement.
φD(xE) = −b1 < φD(xR) = b2 ∀ xE ∈ XE,xR ∈ XR (2.24)
where b1 and b2 are constants. The reason they are constant for all x ∈ XE and x ∈ XR is
because the sole concern of the defender is whether to terminate the game in engagement
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or retreat. The terminal value functions are:
φA(xf ) =

a1, xf ∈ XE




−b1, xf ∈ XE
0, xf ∈ XR
(2.26)
It is assumed that a1 > 0, b1 > 0. An assumption is made that each agent has complete
knowledge of the state of the system for the entire duration of the game. Another assump-
tion made is that the attacker exercises superior control and dynamic characteristics in such
a manner that it can force the game to terminate in either from the engagement region
xE ∈ XE or in the retreat region xR ∈ XR from any initial state x0 ∈ RA. Therefore, the
attacker has the freedom to choose whether to end the game in engagement or retreat and
the defender cannot deter the attacker or prevent the attacker directly from engaging it.
The defender indirectly deters the attacker from engaging it, by manipulating the in-
stantaneous cost of the game present in the utility function of the attacker as seen in equa-
tion(2.20). The manipulation is done in such a manner that a trajectory that leads from the
initial state x0 to the retreat state xR yields a better utility value than all the trajectories that
would travel from the initial state x0 to any state in the engagement region xE ∈ XE . If
the defender can successfully create the above stated scenario, the attacker will choose to
retreat instead of engaging the defender, thereby maximizing the defender’s utility function
because φD(xE) < φD(xR) .
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2.3 Game Definition
A differential game is defined with the agent utility functions (2.20) and (2.21) as defined
above:
U∗A(uD(t); x0) = max
uA(t)
UA(uA(t),uD(t); x0) (2.27)
U∗D(uA(t); x0) = max
uD(t)
UD(uA(t),uD(t); x0) (2.28)
For a given initial state, each agent attempts to maximize their respective utility functions.
The Nash Equilibrium solution to the game defined above is the pair of equilibrium open-
loop strategies u∗A(t; x0) and u
∗
D(t; x0) , and the resulting equilibrium utility values U
∗
A(x0)
and U∗D(x0) that satisfy the below listed Nash Equilibrium conditions:
UA(uA(t),u
∗
D(t); x0) = U
∗





D(t); x0) = U
∗
D(x0) ≥ UD(u∗A(t),uD(t); x0) (2.30)
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Solution Technique
The solution to the Engage or Retreat Game is obtained by addressing two related opti-
mization problems referred to as the Game of Engagement(GoE) and Optimal Constrained
Retreat(OCR). The solution to either the GoE or OCR for any given initial state x0 will be
the equilibrium solution to the general ERG. The strategies for each agent are expressed in
terms of solutions to one of the two optimization problems.
3.1 Game of Engagement
The first optimization problem called the Game of Engagement or Game of Attack rep-
resents the situation when the attacker engages/attacks the defender. It has already been
mentioned that the attacker possesses the choice to force the state to the termination sur-
face. The game terminates when the attacker captures the defender i.e;, when the attacker
reaches within a pre-defined distance radius of the defender known as capture distance.
In the game of engagement or game of attack, the attacker attempts to terminate the
game in engagement i.e; maximize the utility function of the attacker while the defender
minimizes the utility function of the attacker UA. The attacker gets a bonus or reward a1
whereas the defender pays a penalty.








with the constraint that ΓE(xf ) = 0.
The equilibrium value of the game starting at the initial conditions x0 is represented
by the function VE(x0) when the attacker and the defender implement their respective equi-
librium open-loop strategies uE∗A (t; x0) and u
E∗
D (t; x0) where
uE∗A (t; x0),u
E∗





This type of formulation represents what is called a standard pursuit evasion game of de-
gree.
The solution to the game is obtained using standard differential techniques. Firstly, the
Hamiltonian is constructed using the system dynamics. Secondly, the adjoint variables are
defined and the optimal control laws are derived. Thirdly, a lagrangian multiplier is found
by solving the Hamiltonian at terminal time. Lastly, the terminal time and value function
along with the state trajectories are derived.
3.1.1 Solution in Global Coordinate System
The Hamiltonian is constructed using the system dynamics (2.3) and the cost function
(2.22) to determine the solution to the game of engagement. The terminal reward or bonus
obtained at the end of the Game of Engagement is not dependent on time and thereby
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renders the Hamiltonian to be equal to zero along the optimal trajectories.
HE : = λ
T
Ef(x, uA,uD) + CT (x, uA,uD)
= λxAEẋA + λY AE ẏA + λxDEẋD + λyDE ẏD + CT
= λxAE(vAcosψ) + λyAE(vAsinψ)+
λxDE(vDcosθ) + λyDE(vDsinθ) + CT
= λxAE(vAcosψ) + λyAE(vAsinψ)+
λxDE(vDcosθ) + λyDE(vDsinθ)− (φ+ c2) = 0 (3.3)
The vector λE contains the adjoint variables conjugate to the kinematics of the attacker and
defender and is also equal to the gradient of the value function.















The adjoint equations are found by taking the partial derivative of the Hamiltonian with

































An adjoined terminal value function is constructed using the capture condition (2.18):
ΦE(xf ) = a1 + ϑEΓE(x)
ΦE(xf ) = a1 + ϑE
(√
(x2Af − x2Df ) + (y2Af − y2Df )− dc
)
(3.8)
where ϑE is a Lagrangian multiplier and (xAf , yAf ) represents the position of the attacker
at terminal time and (xDf , yDf ) represents the position of the defender at terminal time.
The adjoint variables at terminal time are obtained by taking the partial derivative of the






























(x2Af − x2Df ) + (y2Af − y2Df )
)
= ϑE
2(xAf − xDf )
2
√
(x2Af − x2Df ) + (y2Af − y2Df )
=









Similarly for the defender,
λxDE(tf ) =




−ϑE(yAf − yDf )
dc
(3.14)
The equilibrium control for the attacker and defender is obtained by minimizing and max-
imizing the Hamiltonian respectively. The Hamiltonian H (3.3) is partially differentiated













































Therefore, the equilibrium control for the attacker and defender are given by equations
(3.15) to and (3.18) respectively. We solve for ϑE by substituting the optimal control equa-
tions(3.15) to (3.18) in the Hamiltonian equation (3.3) and evaluating at terminal time:
HE := λxAE(tf )
λxAE(tf )√






















−(φ+ c2) = 0
HE : =
(













λ2xDE(tf ) + λyDE(tf )
2(tf )
vD − (φ+ c2) = 0
HE : =
(√










vD − (φ+ c2) = 0
(3.19)
From (3.11) and (3.12) the following relation is obtained:


















Using equation (2.4) and (2.18) in equation (3.20),







λ2xAE(tf ) + λ
2
yAE(tf ) = ϑ
2
E (3.21)






Using equations (3.20) and (3.22) in equation (3.19):
vA(ϑ
2
E)− vD(ϑ2E)− (c1 + c2) = 0








This implies that ϑE could be positive or negative. We choose the negative value because






The adjoint values at the terminal time as a function of the terminal state are obtained by
substituting equation (3.24) in the terminal adjoint equations (3.11) to (3.14):




































A boundary value problem is created by combining the optimal control equations(3.15)
to (3.18), system dynamics(3.33) to(3.36), adjoint equations (3.4) to (3.7) and terminal ad-
joint equations (3.25) to (3.28). The complete solution to the game can be calculated ana-
lytically for each set of initial state x0. The solution to the boundary value problem is the
solution to the differential game of engagement.
Theorem 1: Suppose the differential game is initiated at x0 = (xA0, yA0, xD0, yD0).The
equilibrium control strategies are,
uE∗A (t; x0) = (ψ
E∗(t; x0)) (3.29)




The resulting state trajectories for x0 are as follows:
φE∗(t; x0) = c1, (3.31)
ψE∗(t; x0) = γE, θ
E∗(t; x0) = δE (3.32)
xE∗A (t; x0) = vAcosγEt+ xA0 (3.33)
yE∗A (t; x0) = vAsinγEt+ yA0 (3.34)
xE∗D (t; x0) = vDcosδEt+ xD0 (3.35)
yE∗D (t; x0) = vDsinδEt+ yD0 (3.36)
t∗f (x0) =
√
(xA0 − xD0)2 + (yA0 − yD0)2 − dc
vA − vD
(3.37)























(xAE − xDE)2 + (yAE − yDE)2
(3.42)
Proof: Since the adjoint derivatives (3.4) to (3.7) do not change over the entire time(they










































(xAE − xDE)2 + (yAE − yDE)2
)
(3.46)
Combining equations (3.43) to (3.46) with the equilibrium control found for the attacker
and the defender (3.15) to (3.18), it can be determined that ψE∗(t,x0) and θE∗(t,x0) are















= − (xAf − xDf )√
(xAf − xDf )2 + (yAf − yDf )2












(yAf − yDf )
dc
(3.50)
We then integrate the equations (3.47) to (3.50) and (2.3) backwards in time to generate the
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xE∗A (t; x0) = vAcosγEt+ xA0 (3.51)
Similarly,
yE∗A (t; x0) = vAsinγEt+ yA0 (3.52)
xE∗D (t; x0) = vDcosδEt+ xD0 (3.53)
yE∗D (t; x0) = vDsinδEt+ yD0 (3.54)
The optimal strategies (3.47) to (3.50) at terminal time are substituted in the system dy-
namics (3.33) to (3.36) which give:
xAE(tf ) =
















Rearranging equations (3.55) to (3.58):
xA0 = xAE(tf )−
vA(xAf − xDf )tf
dc
(3.59)
yA0 = yAE(tf )−
vA(yAf − yDf )tf
dc
(3.60)
xD0 = xDE(tf )−
vD(xAf − xDf )tf
dc
(3.61)
yD0 = yDE(tf )−
vD(yAf − yDf )tf
dc
(3.62)




1− tf (vA − vD)
dc
)2
+ (yA0 − yD0)2
(
1− tf (vA − vD)
dc
)2
− dc = 0
(3.63)
Rearranging for terminal time,
t∗f (x0) =
√
(xA0 − xD0)2 + (yA0 − yD0)2 − dc
vA − vD
The Value function for the game of engagement is obtained from the terminal time.




VE(x0) = a1 − (c1 + c2)(tf − t0)





(xA0 − xD0)2 + (yA0 − yD0)2 − dc
)








D(t; x0); x0) = VE(x0) (3.64)
UD(x0)




D(t; x0); x0) = φD(xf ∈ XE) = b1 (3.65)
3.1.2 Solution in Relative Coordinate System
The Game of Engagement is solved in the Relative Coordinate system in the same manner
as was followed for the Global Coordinate system. The optimal control strategies and the
resulting trajectories have to be calculated in order to solve the game. Firstly, the optimal-
ity conditions of differential games are calculated as set forth first in Rufus Isaacs. The
Hamiltonian for the equations is constructed as follows by utilising the system dynamics
(2.10)-(2.13) and the cost function (2.22) as follows:
HE =λ
T
Ef(xR, uA,uD) + CT (xR, uA,uD)
HE =λxAEẋA + λyAE ẏA + λβEβ̇ + λdE ḋ− (φ+ c2)






+λdE(−vAcosψ̂ + vDcosθ̂)− (φ+ c2)
= 0 (3.66)
The game of engagement ends in capture and the reward for ending the game is not depen-
dent on time, the Hamiltonian will be zero along the optimal trajectories. The vector λE
contains the adjoint variable conjugate to the kinematics, the adjoint equations are found
by taking the partial derivative of the hamiltonian(3.66) with respect to the corresponding
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state components.
















The adjoint equations are found by taking the partial derivative of the Hamiltonian with






































A terminal value function is constructed from the capture condition (2.18) with the terminal
reward.
ΦE(xf ) = a1 + ϑEΓE(x)
ΦE(xf ) = a1 + ϑE(d− dc) (3.72)
where a1 is the terminal reward.
Taking partial derivatives of the terminal condition (3.72) with respect to the appro-
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The Hamiltonian is always zero along the optimal trajectories and at terminal time t = tf
it can be solved to obtain a lagrangian multiplier νE with the help of the optimal control
which will be obtained as follows. When the adjoint variables at terminal time (3.73) to
(3.71) are substituted in the Hamiltonian (3.66) the following equation is obtained:
HE(tf ) = λdE(tf )[vDcos(θ̂
E∗)(tf )− vAcos(ψ̂E∗)(tf )]− (c1 + c2) = 0 (3.77)
Using lemma on circular vectograms from Issacs[5], the attacker is maximized and the







= −sgn(λdE(tf )) (3.78)
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=− sgn(λdE(tf )) (3.79)
Substituting equations (3.76), (3.78) and (3.79) in (3.66):
ϑEvD(−sgn(ϑE))− ϑEvA(−sgn(ϑE))− (c1 + c2) = 0













For the game of engagement to terminate the distance between the attacker and defender
should reduce with an increase in time. This is possible only when λdE is positive since ḋ












because the attacker should capture
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the defender. So equation (3.81) is placed in: (3.78) and (3.79):









) = 1 (3.82)









) = 1 (3.83)
This leads to,
ψ̂E∗(tf ) = arccos(1) = 0 (3.84)
θ̂E∗(tf ) = arccos(1) = 0 (3.85)
A boundary value problem is created by combining the optimal control strategies
(3.84) and (3.85), adjoint equations (3.68) to (3.71), adjoint variables at terminal time (3.73)
to (3.76) and system dynamics (2.10) to (2.13).
Theorem 2:Suppose the differential game of engagement begins at x0 = (xA0, yA0, d0, β0).
The equilibrium strategies are,
uE∗A (t; x0) = (ψ̂
E∗(t,x0)) (3.86)




and the state trajectories are as follows:
φE∗(t; x0) = c1, (3.88)
ψ̂E∗(t; x0) = 0, θ̂
E∗(t; x0) = 0 (3.89)
xE∗A (t; x0) = vAcos(ψ̂ + β)t+ xA0 (3.90)
yE∗A (t; x0) = vAsin(ψ̂ + β)t+ yA0 (3.91)









VE(x0) = a1 −
(c1 + c2)(d0 − dc)
(vA − vD)
(3.95)
Proof: Since the adjoint equations (adjoint derivatives) (3.68) and (3.69) are zero and the
adjoint variables at terminal time (3.73) and (3.74) are zero we know that:
λE∗xA(t) = 0 (3.96)
λE∗yA(t) = 0 (3.97)
Using equations (3.96) and (3.97) in (3.70) we know that:
λE∗β (t) = 0 (3.98)
Using equation (3.98) in equation (3.71) we know that:
λE∗d (t) = νE







Combining equations (3.96) to (3.99) and the equilibrium control of the attacker (3.84)
and the defender (3.85) it can be deduced that ψ̂E∗(t,x0) = 0 and θ̂E∗(t,x0) = 0. We
integrate backwards in time to get the optimal trajectories, the terminal time and the Value
Function.






(vDcosθ̂ − vAcosψ̂)dt (3.100)
After integrating we get,
dE∗(t; x0) = (vDcosθ̂ − vAcosψ̂)t+ d(t0)
dE∗(t; x0) = (vDcosθ̂ − vAcosψ̂)t+ d0 (3.101)
where d(t0) = d0 is the distance at time t0.



































=vAcos(ψ̂ + β)t+ ct
where ct is a constant of integration.
At t = t0 we have xA = xA(t0) = xA0. Therefore, we obtain
xE∗A (t; x0) = vAcos(ψ̂ + β)t+ xA0 (3.105)
Similarly,
yE∗A (t; x0) = vAsin(ψ̂ + β)t+ yA0 (3.106)
When the optimal control laws (3.84) and (3.85) are substituted in equation(3.92), the ter-
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minal time equation is obtained.








where d(tF ) = dc because the distance at terminal time is equal to the capture distance.
The Value function for the Game of Engagement is obtained by integrating the cost over
the period of time. The terminal time equation is obtained from (3.94).




VE(x0) = a1 − (c1 + c2)(tf − t0)
VE(x0) = a1 −
(c1 + c2)(d0 − dc)
(va − vd)
(3.108)
When these equilibrium strategies are implemented, the resulting utility functionals for the
agents are:




D(t; x0); x0) = VE(x0) (3.109)




D(t; x0); x0) = φD(xf ∈ XE) = b1 (3.110)
3.2 Optimal Constrained Retreat
The second optimization problem referred to as the Optimal Constrained Retreat arises
when the attacker along with the co-operation of the defender, retreats to a pre-defined
boundary. The attacker ends the game in retreat while attempting to maximizing its utility
function. The defender also attempts to maximize the attacker’s utility function. Addition-
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ally, the defender encourages the attacker to avoid moving into regions where engagement
would be optimal.
Since both agents have the same objective of maximizing the attacker’s utility func-
tion, they can be combined to form a single player and the problem reduces to a traditional
continuous optimal control problem defined as:








with the terminal constraint (2.19). During the retreat, it is plausible that the state may move
into a region where engagement becomes an attractive option. To prevent the occurrence
of such an incident and to ensure that the attacker goes into the retreat region, a constraint
is imposed on the value function of the retreat.
VR(x(t))− VE(x(t)) ≥ 0 ∀[t0, tf ] (3.112)
where VE(x(t)) is the value function for the Game Of engagement. To include the value
function constraint (3.112) in the optimal control problem, we will create the additional
state component c(t) by converting it into a state inequality constraint. The time derivative
of the additional state component ċ(t) is defined as:
ċ = −CA(uA(t),uD(t),x(t)) (3.113)
= −(uDc1 + c2)
The state component signifies the remaining integral cost for the rest of the game and it has
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a terminal value of:
c(tf ) = 0 (3.114)
The value function constraint is restated as a state variable constraint using the state com-
ponent(3.114). The value function for the optimal constrained retreat VR(x) can now be
rewritten with c(t) as:








= φA(x(tf ))− c(tf ) + c(t)
= φA(x(tf )) + c(t) (3.115)
Using equation (3.115), the state inequality constraint (3.112) can be written as:
g(x) = VR(x(t))− VE(x(t)) ≥ 0 (3.116)
g(x) = φA(x(tf )) + c(t)− VE(x(t)) ≥ 0 (3.117)
The presence of a control variable is necessary to determine the effects of the constraint
on the optimal control strategies. The state inequality constraint g(x) is not an explicit
function of control. It is differentiated with respect to time, till an expression that is solely





The control constraint is obtained by taking the derivative of the state inequality constraint
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(3.116) which can be written as:
h(x) : = g′(x) = V ′R(x(t))− V ′E(x(t)) (3.118)

































The dynamics of the state ḋ is substituted in the above equation:


















The Hamiltonian for the Optimal Constrained Retreat is constructed using the system
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dynamics (2.10) to (2.13), utility function of the attacker (2.20) and the control equality
constraint (3.121) now becomes:
HR = λR(ẋ) + µh(x) + CA(uA(t),uD(t),x(t))
Expanding the Hamiltonian:
HR = λxARẋA + λyARẏA + λβRβ̇ + λdRḋ+ λcRċ+ µh(x) + [−(uDc1 + c2)] = 0
= λxARvAcos(ψ̂ + β)











+ λcR[−(uDc1 + c2)]
+ µ
[







+ [−(uDc1 + c2)]
= 0 (3.122)
where λR is the adjoint variable that contains the gradient of the value function of the OCR:



















The additional adjoint variable µ is a scalar and seeks to impose the control constraint when
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the state inequality constraint becomes active displaying the behaviour listed below.
µ(t) = 0 g(x(t)) > 0
µ(t) > 0 g(x(t)) = 0
The adjoint equations are found by taking the partial derivative of the Hamiltonian (3.122)
with respect to the appropriate state components. The General form of the adjoint equations























However, in this Optimal Constrained Retreat problem,the control constraint (3.121), does
























λ̇cR = 0 (3.128)
A terminal value function is constructed with the terminating condition (2.19) where νR is
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a lagrangian multiplier.
φR(xf ) = 0 + νRΓR(x)
φR(xf ) = 0 + νR(yA − yR) (3.129)
The values of the adjoint variables at terminal time are calculated by taking the partial











































The Hamiltonian is rearranged so that the co-efficients of the attacker and defender
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optimal control can be easily taken.
cosψ̂R∗
(




























+ (λcR + µ+ 1) [−(uDc1 + c2)] = 0 (3.136)



















k1 = λxARvAcosβ + λyARvAsinβ






























k1, k2, k3 and k4 are the co-efficients of cosψ̂R∗, sinψ̂R∗, cosθ̂R∗ and sinθ̂R∗ respectively.
The resulting Defender cost control:
uD =

0, for − λcR − µ− 1 ≤ 0
1, for − λcR − µ− 1 > 0
The game is assumed to end on an unconstrained segment thereby rendering the adjoint
variable µ = 0. The lagrangian multiplier νR is calculated by evaluating the Hamilto-
nian(3.122) at terminal time, the adjoint equations (3.131) to (3.135) at terminal time and
equilibrium control strategies (3.137) to (3.140):













− c2 = 0
(3.147)
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To decide the sign of the parameter, we look at the attacker’s equilibrium control which



























Figure 3.1: Solution Regions for OCR
The structure of the optimal trajectories for certain initial states is complicated by the
state inequality constraint (3.116) imposed. Additionally, a solution does not exist that
satisfies the value constraint imposed by (3.117) for certain other initial states x0. All
possible initial states x0 = (xA0, yA0, d0, β0) fall into any of the four regions defined below
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as shown in Figure 3.1:
R1 := {x0 ∈ RA|β < βT1, β > βT2} (3.149)
R2 := {x0 ∈ RA|βT1 < β < βT2} (3.150)
R3 := {x0 ∈ RA|βT1 < β < βT2,m1(x0) < 0, 0 < m2(x0)} (3.151)













































The proof for equations (3.154),(3.155) and (3.156) are shown in Theorem 4. An equation
could not be obtained by hand for m2(x) = 0. It will be explained further on how the
solution for that region was obtained.
Theorem 3:The system dynamics for the unconstrained segment or a given initial con-
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dition x0 = (xA0, yA0, d0, β0) at time t0 for region R1 ∪R2




θ̂R∗(t; x0) = triviallyoptimal (3.158)
xR∗A (t; x0) = xA(tf ) (3.159)
yR∗A (t; x0) = yR + (t− tf )vA (3.160)




V R∗R (x0) = −
c2
vA
(yA − yR) (3.162)
Proof: Starting on the terminal surface,defined by equation (2.19) at terminal time
based on the assumption that the game terminates on an unconstrained segment thereby,







−λxARvAsinβ + λyARvAcosβ − λβRd vA









When the terminal equations, (3.131) to (3.134) are substituted in (3.163), the optimal
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The adjoint variables at terminal time (3.131) to (3.134) when substituted in equations


















From equations (3.165) and (3.166) the defender’s control is trivially optimal as long as it
remains in the above defined region.
By examining the adjoint variables at terminal time(3.131),(3.132) ,(3.135) and the
adjoint equation derivatives (3.124),(3.125),(3.128), the adjoint equations for the duration
of unconstrained segment are deduced.





λcR(t) = 0 (3.169)
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Using the optimal control derived as per eqns(3.164) ,(3.182), the adjoint variables at termi-
nal time(3.133),(3.134), the adjoint equations (3.126),(3.127) along with the adjoint equa-
tions for the duration of unconstrained segment (3.167),(3.168) and (3.169) the equations
reduce as follows:





− β + β)
= 0 (3.170)
This makes
λ̇dR = 0 (3.171)
Thereby,
λβR(t) = 0 (3.172)
λdR(t) = 0 (3.173)
Substituting equations (3.167) to (3.173) the attacker optimal control for the unconstrained
segment is obtained as,
sinψR∗(t) = −1 (3.174)
cosψR∗(t) = 0 (3.175)
Theorem 4: At the point of exit xT = (dT , βT , xAT , yAT ), the set of state values that satisfy
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the tangency constraints are given by:
yAT =
[
































Proof: The points where the optimal trajectory exits the constrained arc are called tangency
points. Tangency conditions come into play when the state constraint becomes active.
These must be imposed to compensate for the constant term lost in the differentiation. The
tangency lines are calculated by starting at terminal time on the terminal surface (2.19)
and integrating backwards in time so that a parametric solution can be obtained for the
unconstrained segment. Define t1 as the time where the state constraint becomes active,
and when the optimal trajectory exits the unconstrained segment. At the point of exit, the
equilibrium trajectories must satisfy both the constraints.





The state constraint and its derivative are:















Rearranging the equations to obtain the tangency conditions in terms of the state dynamics:
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Taking g(x) equation (3.116) and substituting (3.95) and (3.162) in it:








































It can be seen from equations (3.165) and (3.166) the optimal control of the defender is
indeterminate. In order to solve the game, it is necessary to take the first step of integration.
It is imperative to know the optimal control of the defender. The limit of evader’s control




















































ˆθR∗ = 0 (3.182)
This implies that the control of the defender is trivially optimal as long as it out of the
retreat boundary.














Substituting the optimal control for the unconstrained segments from eqns (3.164) and
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(vD(1) + vAsinβT )



































The solution for h(x) gives two solutions which leads to two tangency lines.
The tangency conditions are non-linear in nature. Moreover, the value function for the
game of retreat when the constraint is active is not known due to the non-linear nature of
yA.
The value of state inequality constraint µ is to be obtained as follows. The value constraint
eqn (3.183) is differentiated with respect to the appropriate state components and adjoint




























































When the optimal control (3.137) to (3.140) along with (3.198) to (3.146) for the con-





































































where z stands for dR, βR, xAR, yAR, c, λxAR, λyAR, λβR, λdR, λcR, µ.
However, for the first step of integration t = t1, the optimal control of the defender is
undefined. Hence, a different equation for µ̇ is used. Since at the time, when it enters the













































































































































































































Using the above equations (3.198) to (3.201) along with the constrained control, adjoint
equations, the value of µ is obtained along the constrained arcs for the set of all initial states
x0. These help in characterizing the lower boundary of the retreat region RR denoted by
m2(x) = 0. This helps in generating a solution for the region R4.
An additional interior boundary constraint has to be taken into consideration when
the value constraint becomes active. Let t1 be the time when the value constraint becomes
active. Then (t1−) and (t1+) represent the times just before and just after the constraint
goes active. The state constraint (3.116) and control constraint (3.121) are rewritten as:














The state constraint creates interior boundary constraint on the adjoint variables which can
be written as :




where g and h are taken from equations (3.202) and (3.203) and the x refers to the state
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variables xAR, yAR, dR, βR, c. So, equation(3.204) reduces to

























Using equation(3.206) in equation(3.205) it reduces to the following set of equations.
λxAR(t1−) = λxAR(t1+) (3.211)
λyAR(t1−) = λyAR(t1+) (3.212)






λβR(t1−) = λβR(t1+) (3.214)
λcR(t1−) = λcR(t1+) + π1(1) (3.215)
The equations (3.202) and (3.203) should be zero around the left and right limits of t1.
Thereby, the optimal control to satisfy this condition must be equal around the left and right
limits of t1. An important note is that at (t1−) the state constraint is inactive. Thereby, the
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k1 = λxAR(t1−)vAcosβ + λyAR(t1−)vAsinβ
− λdR(t1−)vA (3.218)






























k1 = λxAR(t1+)vAcosβ + λyAR(t1+)vAsinβ



























































Using equation (3.214) it reduces to:






We have another equation relating the adjoint variables just before and after t1 which is
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equation(3.213). Comparing this equation with equation (3.233) we get,
π1 = µ(t1+) (3.234)
Using the optimal control of the attacker a similar result is obtained. From equations










d = (λxAR(t1−)vAcosβ + λyAR(t1−)vAsinβ − λdR(t1−)vA)
e = (λxAR(t1−)vAcosβ + λyAR(t1−)vAsinβ − λdR(t1−)vA)2
f =
(

































From (3.236) and (3.237),(3.214),(3.211),(3.212) we get






We have another equation relating the adjoint variables just before and after t1 which is
equation(3.213).Comparing this equation with equation (3.238) we get
π1 = µ(t1+) (3.239)
A dispersal surface exists where the global equilibrium solution divides the admissible state
space into two regions that contain qualitatively different equilibrium control strategies.
The mobile attacker could retreat from any of the two optimal paths provided. So, the
symmetry of all such initial states constitutes a dispersal surface.
Theorem 5: The surface S := {x ∈ RA|β = −π2} represents a dispersal surface
within the global equilibrium solution of the game.
Proof: A symmetric solution x̄(t; x0), λ̄(t; x0),
¯̂ψ(t; x0),
¯̂θ(t; x0) can be constructed
by switching the sign of λβ(t; x0) and integrating forward in time. Let x̄0 = x0 and
λ̄0 = (λ̄xA, λ̄yA,−λ̄β, λ̄d, λ̄c).
From the equilibrium feedback strategies, we observe that a change in sign of λ̄β(t; x0)
implies,
λ̄xAR(t; x0) = λxAR(t; x0) (3.240)
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At the dispersal surface β = −π
2
,






























ψR∗ = −ψ̂R∗ (3.243)
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θR∗ = −θ̂R∗ (3.244)
Substituting these initial conditions in the state dynamics,the following is observed.




Thereby, integrating forward in time:
d̄ = d (3.246)
From the tangency line, we know that






= vAcos((−ψ̂) + π − β)
= vAcos(π − (ψ̂ + β))






= vAsin((−ψ̂) + π − β)
= vAsin(π − (ψ̂ + β))
= vAsin(ψ̂ + β)
= ẏA (3.249)
From equations (3.246) and (3.247), it can be seen that the d and yA components are equal
and both solutions terminate at the same terminal time: tf = t̄f . The utilities of the attacker
and defender are equal, the states contained in S satisfy the condition for a dispersal surface.
3.3 Overall Engage or Retreat Game
There may exist values for the initial state x0 in which the control strategies uA(t) and
uD(t) do not exist, that satisfy the constraint and boundary conditions. This causes a divide
in the solution dividing the admissible state space RA into two disjoint regions. A region
which has states where the solution to the OCR exists and a second region which has states
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where a solution does not exist.
These are defined as:
RR : = R1 ∪R2 ∪R4 (3.250)
RE : = R3 (3.251)
The overall solution to the ERG is found by identifying which region the state x0 belongs
to and by implementing the control strategies corresponding to that region as defined in the
following theorem.
Theorem 6: Suppose that regions RR and RE can be known or calculated. Along the
boundary of RR suppose that VR(x) ≥ VE(x). The following control strategies constitute
a Nash Equilibrium for the Engage or Retreat Game defined in (3.250) and (3.251).
u∗A(t; x0) =

u∗EA (t; x0) x0 ∈ RE
u∗RA (t; x0) x0 ∈ RR
u∗D(t; x0) =

u∗ED (t; x0) x0 ∈ RE
u∗RD (t; x0) x0 ∈ RR
The resulting Nash Equilibrium utilities for each player are
U∗A(x0) =

VE(x0) x0 ∈ RE





b1 x0 ∈ RE
0 x0 ∈ RR
The equilibrium strategies, state trajectories and adjoint values are given by the solutions
of the GoE or OCR that correspond to the equilibrium control strategies. The proof for this
theorem can be found in [1].
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Numerical Solutions
In this chapter, the equilibrium trajectories and regions will be examined for the two related
optimization problems namely the Game of Engagement and the Optimal Constrained Re-
treat. Numerical solutions are obtained for the differential game. The following parameter
values are used for the GoE.
vA = 1.5 vD = 1 c1 = 1 c2 = 1 dc = 1 yR = −4. For, the OCR and ERG the
attacker’s velocity is increased to vA = 3.5, so that the results are visually clear and are
easier to explain.
4.1 Game of Engagement
The Figure 4.1 shows a numerical example for the GoE in the global coordinate system.
The capture surface is depicted as a unit circle
√
x2 + y2 = 1. The trajectories of the mo-
bile attacker and mobile defender are in red and blue respectively as seen in Figure 4.1. The
initial position of the attacker and defender are x0 = (xA0, yA0, xD0, yD0) = (0, 0,−5,−5).
The attacker attacks the defender and captures it when the distance between them reduces
to the capture radius and is represented by a red cross on the capture circle. Figure 4.2
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Figure 4.1: Global Coordinate Solution-Initial state 1











Figure 4.2: Global Coordinate Solution-Initial state 2
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Figure 4.4: Relative Solution
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Figure 4.5: Relative Solution Adjoint Variables




































Figure 4.7: Game Of Engagement-Relative Multiple
shows the trajectories for the initial state of x0 = (xA0, yA0, xD0, yD0) = (0, 0, 5, 5). The
adjoint variables of the mobile attacker and mobile defender throughout the game of attack
are as shown in Figure 4.3. These were obtained for the equilibrum trajectories shown in
Figure 4.1. The adjoint variables of the attacker and the defender have the same magnitude
but have their signs reversed. The adjoint variables for the mobile attacker and the mobile
defender are constant throughout the game of attack.
The initial condition to generate the numerical solution in the Relative system is x0 =
(xA0, yA0, d0, β0) = (0, 0,−2.325, 7.0711). A sample optimal trajectory is seen in Figure
4.4. To plot the trajectory for the game of attack in the Relative coordinate systems the
following axes are used. The x-axis is dcos(β). The y-axis is dsin(β). The z-axis is the y
co-ordinate of the attacker yA. The equilibrium trajectory shows that for the mobile attacker
to capture the mobile defender, the distance d is the only state component that changes. This
is further illustrated by the Figure 4.5 where except the adjoint variable λd, the other adjoint
variables are zero. To show that the Global and Relative coordinate systems are equivalent
to each other, the same initial condition used to generate a numerical solution in Global
system is converted to the Relative System using equations (2.14) to (2.17). The Figure 4.6
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shows the result obtained in relative coordinate system when converted to global coordinate
system. The trajectories of the mobile attacker and the mobile defender are the same as in
Figure 4.1.If the equilibrium trajectories are plotted for a range of initial conditions x0
the Figure 4.7 is obtained. The cylinder represents the capture surface. The radius is the
capture distance and the height is the attacker’s y co-ordinates. The mobile attacker can be
seen to capture the mobile defender for all x0 in R3.
4.2 Optimal Constrained Retreat
In the figures from 4.8 to 4.13 the capture surface is depicted as a cylinder along the Z-axis.
The retreat surface is shown as a mesh plane at yr = −4. The equilibrium trajectories
for regions for R1 ∪ R2 are shown in Figures 4.8 and 4.9. The blue trajectories show
the solution for several initial states. The upper bound is m1(x) for the unconstrained
trajectories of R1 ∪ R2. The tangency lines are depicted by red lines (d ∗ cosβT1, d ∗
sinβT1, yAT ) and (d ∗ cosβT2, d ∗ sinβT2, yAT ).
In Figure 4.10, the blue trajectories reach the lower bound m2(x) tangentially and
travel along the lower bound till they approach the tangency lines depicted in red. The
surface β = −π
2
is the dispersal surface. Two trajectories on either side of the tangency
lines can be seen traveling to reach the retreat surface in Figure 4.11 in region R4. The
escort region is represented by the region R4. In this region, the defender cooperates with
the attacker to maximize the utility of the attacker. The attacker follows a constrained
retreat trajectory so that it does not enter the region of engagement. The defender escorts
the attacker till the state reaches the tangency line away from where engagement could be
optimal.
Figure 4.13 displays the equilibrium trajectories in black for the Game of Engagement
where the attacker engages the defender and terminates the game at the capture surface.
This is the region of engagement R3 and it is enclosed by the upper boundary m1(x) = 0
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and by the lower boundary m2(x) = 0. Figure 4.12 shows sample equilibrium trajectories
for both tangency lines obtained for regions R2,R3,R4 converted to the global coordinate
system. The black and red lines represent the trajectories of the mobile attacker and mobile
defender from tangency line 1. The tangency line is represented by a ’x’ marker. The
attacker travels and enters the constrained region tangentially at t1 and leaves the arc at t2
to travel and reach the retreat surface. The defender can be seen to travel away from the
attacker. The defender effectively avoids capture by the attacker as can be seen from the
trajectories.
In the following Figures, 4.14,4.15,4.16 the adjoint variables are shown. The red lines
indicate the unconstrained segments and the blue line indicates the constrained segment. A
discontinuity can be seen in the λd(t) and µ(t) at t1 = 81.98s. This is due to the appearance
of the interior boundary condition when the constraint becomes active.
In the Figures 4.17,4.18 the control of the mobile attacker and mobile defender are
shown. The control is continuous. The mobile attacker’s control is seen to be constant
during the time interval (t1, t2). This is the time when the constraint is active. The mo-
bile defender’s control varies during the time interval implying that it cooperates with the
attacker and escorts it around regions where engagement could occur.
In Figure 4.19, the dashed black line represents the value function for the Game of En-
gagement, along VE(x∗R(t)). The trajectory can be seen entering the constraint tangentially
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Figure 4.11: Equilibrium Trajectories for R4
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Figure 4.12: OCR solution R2,R3,R4 in Global coordinates
Figure 4.13: Equilibrium Trajectories for R3
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Figure 4.14: Adjoint Variables for Tangency Line 1




























Figure 4.15: Adjoint Variables for Tangency Line 2
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Figure 4.16: Control Constraint



















Figure 4.17: Optimal Control for Tangency Line 1
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Figure 4.18: Optimal Control for Tangency Line 2


















Figure 4.19: Cost Component
77
4.3 Overall Engage or Retreat Game
Figure 4.20 shows the complete solution to the Engage or Retreat differential game by
combining the equilibrium trajectories for all admissible states which are represented by
RA which consists of all the states x0 for which solutions exist.
Figure 4.20: Equilibrium Trajectories for RA
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Conclusion
The thesis solves an Engage or Retreat differential Game for mobile agents. Solutions for
two related optimization problems are obtained and proven as equilibrium solutions to the
ERG. For certain initial states, it is optimal that the defender should cooperate with the
attacker to maximize its utility function so that retreat looks like the best option available.
This is achieved by imposing a constraint on the Value function for the OCR which pro-
duces of constrained retreat called escort regions. This is the region where the defender
and attacker work together to avoid entering a region where engagement becomes optimal.
The Value functions are equal during the constrained portions. Although a discontinuity, is
seen in the adjoint variables λd(t), µ(t), the control of the agents is seen to be continuous.
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